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Jennifer McKitrick:
Mumford and Anjum’s Getting Causes from Powers is an ambitious and orig-
inal contribution to the literature on causation, a welcome departure from Hu-
mean approaches which reductively analyze causation in terms of regularities or 
counterfactual conditionals. The authors develop an account of causation as the 
exercising of powers, a view they call “causal dispositionalism.” This critique of 
Getting Causes from Powers is organized around its central heuristic—the vector 
model of causation. On this model, vectors represent the exercising of powers, 
those that are operating upon a quality space. A quality space is a background 
against which events can occur, where two or more general properties are con-
sidered as possible for instantiation. A central line represents a starting point of 
a causal process, and vectors represent the powers in play. A vector is apt for 
representing a power because it has intensity and a direction, indicated by its 
length and the property term at which it points (24). A resultant vector R is also 
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depicted, indicating the extent to which all of the powers in play collectively dis-
pose toward one of the properties in the quality space. A threshold may also be 
depicted, representing a point on the quality space that may be of particular prag-
matic interest, the passing of which would count as disposing toward an effect in 
question. Mumford and Anjum make the bold claim that all things can be repre-
sented by vectors (45–46). This claim is supported by the following theses: every-
thing has properties; properties are clusters of powers; powers have intensity and 
direction; vectors represent intensity and direction. Even granting these theses, 
there is still much that the vectors do not represent. I discuss three things that are 
not represented by the vector model, in increasing order of significance for the ac-
count generally. 
First, vectors do not represent particular objects, the things that have prop-
erties. While a vector diagram may show that an intense power to heat and a 
moderate power to cool collectively tend towards warmth, it leaves us in the 
dark as to what particulars have these powers. As Mumford and Anjum ac-
knowledge, “Properties do not… float around freely in the world. They are 
properties of things” (1). One might argue, on the contrary, that vectors can in 
fact represent particulars for the following reason: particulars are bundles of 
properties, properties are bundles of powers, and powers can be represented by 
vectors. But even if Mumford and Anjum advocate a bundle-theory of particu-
lars, the vector model does not represent the bundling, so it does not indicate 
which powers are bundled together constituting properties, nor which proper-
ties are bundled together constituting particulars. Perhaps one can give an ac-
count of causation without mentioning particulars. But it is not clear that one 
can represent “all things” without representing particulars. 
Secondly, the vector model does not represent effects or events. This strikes 
me as especially problematic, since the model is supposed to be a model of cau-
sation, and as Mumford and Anjum acknowledge, “token causal truths are fac-
tive” (15). “a is the cause of b” is not true if b does not occur. A picture of causa-
tion that is silent as to whether any particular effect occurred is an incomplete 
picture. The resultant R is not the effect, only the extent to which the total cause 
disposes toward an effect. It does not show what is caused, only what is disposed 
to be caused (26). On Mumford and Anjum’s view, R disposes towards the effect, 
but does not necessitate it: “we should never say more than that a causal situa-
tion overall disposed towards a certain outcome. Even the resultant vectors can 
represent nothing more than a tendency toward an effect” (175). So, R crossing 
the threshold is consistent with the effect not occurring. If, in order to be a cause, 
something must have an effect, everything represented in a vector diagrams is 
consistent with no causation happening. So, it is not clear why we should think 
that the vector model is a model of causation at all. 
Mumford and Anjum consider this objection and deal with it in the follow-
ing way. Causation occurs whenever powers operate. Even if the resultant power 
disposes toward passing a threshold but fails to do so, some causation has still 
occurred: be it a change that is short of the threshold or no change at all (74). They 
argue that “there can be cases of causation where nothing is outwardly happen-
ing” (29). Where this is no change, no event occurs, and the effect of the powers 
at work is an equilibrium. They offer as examples two books leaning against each 
other, a magnet clinging to a refrigerator, a ball making a depression in a cush-
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ion, and a tug-of-war contest at a stalemate. These are all convincing examples of 
powers balancing out, causing an “uneventful” effect. However, just as any vec-
tor diagram only represents a tendency toward an effect, a zero resultant vec-
tor represents only a tendency toward equilibrium, and, by parity of reasoning, 
should not be taken to indicate that equilibrium is actually achieved in the sit-
uation being modeled. Mumford and Anjum admit, “the vector model does not 
show what actually happened” (74). Consequently, the vector model does not de-
pict effects, be they events or nonevents. 
Here, Mumford and Anjum claim that causation is happening whenever 
powers are exercising, even if an effect threshold is not met. However, when 
making the case for the simultaneity of cause and effect, they are less inclined 
to recognize causation that can fall short of achieving its effect. In response to 
Hume’s claim that the rolling of ball a preceded and caused the rolling of ball 
b, they claim “It would be absurd to say that the causing, or any part of it, was 
occurring prior to this impact” because “we could have stopped the ball at any 
point along the one-meter roll it took before the impact and the causation would 
not have occurred” (108). Likewise, in the case of a decision to raise one’s hand 
preceding and causing a rising of one’s hand, they argue: “Any decision prior 
to the raising cannot be the cause of the raising because of the possibility of a 
change of mind or forgetfulness” (206). This is confusing, since, in other cases, 
especially in the arguments against necessity, the possibility of interference is 
not taken to undermine a causal claim. Firing a gun at someone is said to be 
capable of causing their death (151), even though it is possible that something 
could have blocked the bullet. Similarly, “As well as having the power to cause 
death… arsenic should also be thought of as having the power to cause any part 
of the whole process that ends in death” (168). 
A third feature of the world that the vector model does not represent is dor-
mant power. Vectors represent only the powers that are exercising or operating 
(38). A dormant power is one that is not exercising itself, not producing its mani-
festation. Mumford and Anjum acknowledge the possibility of dormant powers: 
“One crucial mark of a disposition is that it can exist unmanifested” (4). Some-
thing can be disposed to be F without actually being F. More strongly, they claim 
that if a property is a disposition, it must be possible for it to fail to manifest; if 
something is necessarily F, it is not the case that it is disposed to be F (177). 
Before I consider that point further, I first need to consider, What is a mani-
festation on Mumford and Anjum’s view? The text is somewhat unclear on this 
point. One might think that the manifestation of a power is the instantiation of 
the property, which, symbolically, it is pointing toward on the vector diagram. 
This is suggested when they say “multiple powers come together and produce an 
effect jointly. The effect is their joint manifestation” (106). Polygeny is important, 
since powers have mutual manifestation partners (12) and might produce differ-
ent results in different situations. Powers are not “always able to do what they 
would have done had they been acting alone or in a different context” (88). When 
a property is dispositional, “there are a certain limited number of outcomes, 
out of all those that are merely possible, that would be the manifestation of the 
power if exercised” (210). While the number of possible manifestations is lim-
ited, it is clear from this context that they are not limited to just one. For example, 
the power of a fire can contribute to pleasurable warmth, a painful burn, melt-
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ing a candle, or boiling water. However, Mumford and Anjum also claim that 
each disposition has a single type of manifestation, and this determines the iden-
tity of that disposition (5). Consequently, we cannot “have the same power with 
different manifestations in different contexts” (224). One power “always makes 
the same type of contribution to any context” (224). As represented on the vector 
model, the same power “must have the same direction” (224). 
I am not sure how to square all of these passages, and doing so is impor-
tant for understanding what it means to say that a power can fail to manifest. It 
might mean that a power and its mutual manifestation partners fail to cross a 
certain threshold we are interested in, or that it is part of a situation with a re-
sultant vector of zero: it is a partial cause of an equilibrium situation. The vec-
tor model has no problem representing such powers. However, there is another 
sense of “manifestation” whereby if a power fails to manifest, it is not exercis-
ing, and it makes no contribution to the causal situation whatsoever. What I am 
calling a “dormant power” has no intensity, it does not move the causal situa-
tion in any direction, and it has no effect on the resultant vector. Consequently, 
it cannot be represented by a vector and does not appear on a vector diagram. If 
there are dormant powers of this type, they are one of the “things” that are not 
represented by vectors. 
There is some evidence in the text to indicate that Mumford and Anjum think 
that there are such dormant powers. In the tug-of-war example, “where the two 
teams pick up the rope and merely hold it, in readiness for action, but without ac-
tually pulling it” there is no power being exercised, there is no causation happen-
ing, and so no vectors appear in the quality space representing that situation (30). 
But presumably, the teams have the power to pull the rope; they are just not ex-
ercising it at the moment. Mumford and Anjum’s defense of simultaneity also re-
quires dormant powers. They discuss a purported counterexample to the simul-
taneity of cause and effect in which someone has a genetic predisposition to a 
disease, but does not develop that disease for decades (223). But since, on their 
view, causation occurs when powers exercise themselves, the mere existence of 
a gene’s power to produce a disease prior to the development of that disease is 
no counterexample to simultaneity of cause and effect as long as that power is 
not exercising. Consequently, they assert “Genes can have dormant periods when 
they do no work (…) As soon as [the gene] is activated, it starts to do its work” 
(233). Further evidence of inactive powers comes from the discussion of “lonely 
powers” (35). On Mumford and Anjum’s view, “if there were just one power at 
work… it would move toward [its manifestation] on its own, unaided by any mu-
tual manifestation partner.” A lonely power is “a power that might be able to 
manifest itself unstimulated or spontaneously” (35). While lonely powers are the-
oretically possible, according to Mumford and Anjum many powers need mutual 
manifestation partners in order to operate. Without their partners, they do not ex-
ercise. So, they say that power that cannot operate without partners should never 
be represented as a solitary vector on a vector diagram (38). Only exercising pow-
ers are represented on vector diagrams, so powers that cannot exercise them-
selves alone cannot appear alone. But since many powers need partners in or-
der to exercise, and since mutual manifestation partners are not always together, 
there must, on Mumford and Anjum’s ontology, be some dormant powers that 
the vector model does not represent. 
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While these criticisms are focused on the vector model of causation, there is 
perhaps a deeper metaphysical point here. What is missing, from not only the 
model, but from the theory of causation is a story about how dormant powers 
become activated. Mumford and Anjum offer an account of triggering or stimu-
lating an effect in terms of adding or removing a power from a situation to take 
it out of equilibrium (37). A spark can be seen as a stimulus for the flammabil-
ity of the gasoline. On Mumford and Anjum’s picture, the spark merely pro-
vided a salient power to an already present collection of powers, and together, 
they jointly passed a threshold, resulting in the fire. On their view, the power of 
the spark is ontologically on a par with the powers of the gasoline and the oxy-
gen, and “stimulus” is merely a pragmatic designation of one of the contribut-
ing powers. They claim that powers are not stimulated as much as they are re-
leased or unleashed (37). 
This “unleash” metaphor suggests that, prior to triggering, a power is try-
ing to push forward, but is held back. The only thing that could hold it back, on 
Mumford and Anjum’s view, would be another power. On a vector model, this 
“leashed” power should be represented by an exercising power with a counter-
vailing power pointing in the opposite direction. When a power is unleashed, 
the countervailing power is removed from the causal situation, and the power 
is free to move the situation in the direction that it points. But this model of 
power activation only works for powers that are already exercising. It does not 
tell us how the truly dormant power, the one that has no representation on the 
vector model, gets activated. 
Given their commitment to the existence of unmanifesting, nonexercising dis-
positions, Mumford and Anjum’s account of causation is incomplete. It is an ac-
count of active, exercising powers coming together to possibly produce an ef-
fect. The fact that nonexercising powers do not appear on the vector diagrams is 
symptomatic of the fact that they are not part of Mumford and Anjum’s causal 
story. Perhaps the unmanifested powers are inert and irrelevant, and the whole 
causal story can be told with the powers that are already active. But then it would 
be otiose to posit them, and perverse to call them powers. However, if dormant 
powers can become active and consequently become causes, and if we lack an ad-
equate account of how that happens, there is more that needs to be said about 
getting causes from powers. 
◊     ◊     ◊     ◊     ◊     ◊     ◊
Anna Marmodoro: 
Mumford and Anjum’s original and stimulating book is about a “novel and 
positive account of causation” which they call “causal dispositionalism.” They 
take causal dispositionalism to be irreducible (4), and in this sense a version of 
causal primitivism. They tip their hands at the outset thus: 
We will simply assume that the world is a world containing real pow-
ers, and our job instead is to show what the theory of causation would 
look like given that assumption (4). 
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Hence, the title “Getting Causes from Powers.” Mumford and Anjum have at 
least three ways to describe their theory of causation. On one version of the ac-
count, which I shall refer to as the co-workers Model, Mumford and Anjum claim 
that “causation happens when powers do their work” (30, my emphasis). The work 
of a power is “producing its own manifestation” (8, my emphasis). So causation 
happens when a power produces its manifestation. But if a power and its man-
ifestation are related as producer and product, the manifestation of a power is 
something numerically different from the power itself, and it is something the 
power is in fact causally related to. 
Confirmation that Mumford and Anjum think of the manifestation of a power 
as something numerically different from the power itself comes from their ex-
planation that “the manifestation of a power will … be itself a further power or 
cluster of powers” (5, my emphasis). The reader might now wonder whether 
this new power is the manifestation of the original power as well as its causal ef-
fect, or is the manifestation of the original power but distinct from that effect. The 
way Mumford and Anjum describe their view allows either reading. For exam-
ple when they write that: “effects are brought about by powers manifesting them-
selves” (7), they seem to allow that the causal effect results from, but is not iden-
tical to, the manifestation of the original power. On the other hand, they write: 
“the manifestation can be thought of as something produced by the two partners 
working together” (34). So here it seems that manifestation and causal effect are 
the same thing. 
If the manifestation of the original power is different from the power’s causal 
effect, we need to know more about what the relation between a manifest-
ing power and its effect is. If the new power is the manifestation of the original 
power as well as the effect of causation, then is the same effect the manifestation 
of (at least) two different powers? But how could this be possible, since the man-
ifestation is what defines a power? Mumford and Anjum hold that “the mani-
festation type determines the identity of the disposition” (5, my emphasis). But in 
some cases, the partner powers will not be of the same type, in which case their 
manifestation could not be the common effect. How could two different types of 
power have the same type of manifestation, and thus, the same definition? If this 
were the case, how could we then tell the two powers apart? (See e.g., Lowe’s ar-
guments in Marmodoro 2010, 8, 26). 
As already briefly mentioned in the preceding quotations from the book, 
Mumford and Anjum hold that powers have manifestation partners; in their ter-
minology, powers “work together” to produce their manifestation. In answer to 
the question: “What makes powers work together?” (100), they tell us that work-
ing together does not amount to interacting: “The powers do not need to inter-
act, as we may grant that [given two heaters in a room] the action of one heater 
has no effect on the action of the other” although the current temperature in the 
room is the product of both heaters’ action. So in what way do powers work to-
gether? What underpins their “togetherness”? Mumford and Anjum reply that: 
“The rough idea is that the powers [work together when they] are working on the 
same subject of change” (100, my emphasis). But what does “working on a subject 
of change” mean, when this is supposed to explain the relation between the part-
ner powers? Do any two (or more) powers concurrently manifesting on a subject 
of change count as partner powers? Is the temporal and/or local overlapping of 
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their manifestation the only connection between them? The nature of this opera-
tion “on the same subject of change” is left unexplained. Additionally, how is the 
powers’ “working on” the subject related to the manifestation of the powers and/
or to the change of the subject? 
By way of elucidation of their idea of co-working powers, Mumford and An-
jum add: “What counts is that there is a localized effect to which each [power] 
makes a contribution” (100, my emphasis). But which metaphysical principles do 
Mumford and Anjum appeal to, in order to “localize” the effect? This will de-
termine which powers are working together, so how do we individuate local-
ized effects independently of their causes? Additionally, are sameness of subject 
of change and localized effect two somewhat equivalent ways of accounting for 
what unites co-working powers? Or is one way intended to elucidate the other? 
But if so, how? 
One key feature of the co-workers model is that the union of the two (or more) 
powers producing a certain manifestation is to be found externally from the pow-
ers themselves, in the “subject of change” and/or (see questions above) the “loca-
tion” of their effect. The other key feature is that the manifestation is a “product” 
of the co-working powers, that is, something external to and numerically differ-
ent from the powers themselves. In developing their account of causation, Mum-
ford and Anjum state elsewhere that “There is a plurality of ways in which pow-
ers compose to produce an effect” (86, my emphasis). They describe the relation 
between a new power and its component powers as being like the relation be-
tween a statue and its clay (43). I shall refer to it as the ingredients Model. The re-
sulting picture is that on the co-workers model, powers produce their effects; on 
the ingredients model, they make up their effects. It is clear that there is a different 
metaphysics in play in the two models. 
How do powers compose to make up their effects? Mumford and Anjum note 
that there are cases of linear composition of powers, as well as cases of nonlinear 
composition: 
A linear system is one in which the extent of the output is directly pro-
portional to the extent of the input, such that if we plotted the func-
tion on a graph, it would give us a straight line. With addition as the 
mode of composition, we would get a straight line because the out-
put would always increase proportionally to the input. Linear com-
position of powers is exemplified by Martin’s Two Triangles model. 
If we look at wealth as a cause of happiness, however, it is plausible 
that the relationship is not linear… The extent of the output (the resul-
tant) is not proportional to the extent of the inputs (the components) 
(89–90).1 
Speaking generally, Mumford and Anjum’s claim is that a power manifests itself 
when, by composing holistically with other powers, it makes up a new power. But 
the examples Mumford and Anjum use to illustrate linear and nonlinear compo-
sition, respectively, are problematic. Regarding the latter example, one can see 
how my wealth and my inheritance are my riches, but it is not clear how they 
1. Note that here and elsewhere the examples are about substances, not powers. Mumford and Anjum 
leave unexplained the details of how such examples illustrate the case of powers.  
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are literally my happiness. The problem with the latter example is that Mumford 
and Anjum take the addition of wealth to wealth to be a mental state (happiness). 
This categorical transition cannot be glossed under nonlinear composition. On 
the other hand, when Mumford and Anjum lean on C. B. Martin’s example to il-
lustrate linear composition as well as their general point about holistic compo-
sition, they run into other difficulties. In Martin’s (2007, 51) words, the example 
goes like this:   
You should not think of disposition partners jointly causing the 
manifestation. Instead, the coming together of the disposition part-
ners is the mutual manifestation; the partnering and their manifes-
tation are identical. This partnering-manifestation identity is seen 
most clearly in cases such as the following. You have two triangle-
shaped slips of papers that, when placed together appropriately, 
form a square. It is not the partnering of the triangles that causes the 
manifestation of the square, but rather the partnering is the mani-
festation (my emphasis). 
By adopting Martin’s example as an illustration their own position, Mumford 
and Anjum reveal a possible ambiguity in the co-workers “production” model 
they explicitly endorse in other parts of the book. What Martin says in the quote 
above is that all there is to the manifestation of a power is the power’s getting to-
gether with its manifestation partner: once together, the powers themselves are 
their manifestation. But, it may also be case that the manifestation is categorically 
different from the powers. Mumford and Anjum would probably welcome this 
result, subsuming both being the manifestation and producing the manifestation 
under a constitution relation, where the two partners constitute the manifesta-
tion (linearly, and nonlinearly). We see this when Mumford and Anjum offer one 
of their own examples in addition to Martin’s example: the case of sodium and 
chlorine. When the two substances are combined into a composite, their powers 
compose holistically, and produce a new power, saltiness. But this does not show 
anything about how the powers of sodium and chlorine jointly cause their mani-
festation, which is making the food they are added to salty. Mumford and Anjum 
add that “the powers of sodium chloride are completely different from those of so-
dium and chlorine separately” (103-4, my emphasis). But then on Mumford’s and 
Anjum’s account, the manifestation relation will not serve as a more fundamen-
tal relation, explanatory of all the other relations that puzzle metaphysicians, but 
rather, manifestation will carry with it all the generalities and problems that these 
metaphysical relations suffer from. 
Let us now consider a third example that Mumford and Anjum offer in an 
unpublished manuscript: the pandas example. The female has the power to pro-
duce fertile eggs, the male has the power to produce sperm; jointly they have the 
power to generate offspring, which one might say is the result of the holistic com-
position of their individual powers. But how this holistically composed power 
comes to be by the mere addition of the female’s to the male’s powers is not ex-
plained. Even this example, in conclusion, does not deliver the explanation we 
are looking for in Mumford’s and Anjum’s position. There is still a gap between 
the co-workers and the ingredients models. 
B o o K  S y M p o S i u M  — c a u S e S  a S  p o w e r S     9
As we saw above, on Mumford’s and Anjum’s ingredients model, the mani-
festation of two or more substances’ powers consists in the replacement of the orig-
inal powers with a new one. This new power is real but un-manifested (until it 
gets together with its own manifestation partner, and produces a further power 
etc.,). But power ontologies which posit that the manifestation of a power is the 
emergence of a new power face the challenge that all there is or can be in the 
world is potential, and that change is simply a transition from one potential state 
of the world to another such state. This is a problem sometimes referred to as the 
“Always packing, never travelling” problem.2 David Armstrong (1997, 80), fol-
lowing C. B. Martin, formulates the problem thus: 
Given purely dispositionalist accounts of properties, particulars would 
seem to be always re-packing their bags as they change properties, yet 
never taking a journey from potency to act. 
All there is to such an ontology is potentiality; such an ontology in other words 
is populated only by powers waiting to get manifested. In answer to the “Al-
ways packing, never travelling” argument, Mumford and Anjum introduce what 
I shall refer to as the Passing Around model. They (5–6) present it thus: 
Rather than attempt a defensive strategy, however, and fight off Arm-
strong’s attack, our approach is to turn the tables. On reflection, the 
idea of causation as a passing around of powers, especially for a pan-
dispositionalist, starts to look extremely attractive (Mumford 2009). 
Some examples will illustrate this. You come in from the cold and sit 
by the fire. You sit by the fire because it is hot, which for the pandis-
positionalist means that it has the power to warm your body. Causa-
tion occurs when the fire warms your body, changing it from cold to 
hot. Armstrong retorts that such causation, for pandispositionalism, 
consists in the mere passing around of powers. In the present case, 
that would mean that the heat of the fire, which consisted in it having the 
power to warm some other object, has been passed on to you. But that sounds 
quite right. (my emphasis) 
The idea that causation happens because of the passing around or transmis-
sion of properties can be traced back to an ancient Greek conception known in the 
literature as the contagion model of causation.3 Aristotle too talked of the trans-
mission of the “form” of the agent’s power onto the patient’s power (cf. Physics 
202a9-11). But, as I have argued elsewhere in press,4 contrary to the traditional 
understanding of the contagion model, even for Aristotle this is a figurative 
way of speaking. The transmission of powerfulness is a way of describing what 
is brought about by causation, as if the patient received the powerfulness of the 
agent. Nothing is actually transferred from the agent to the patient; what takes 
2. It is Molnar (2003, 173) who called it the “Always packing, never travelling” argument.
3. For an account of the model in ancient thought with particular reference to Aristotle, see e.g. Scalt-
sas (1989). The contagion model was also revived in early modern philosophy; see for reference e.g. 
O’Neill (1993, 44). 
4. Marmodoro (2007, 2013a, 2013b, unpublished)   
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place is not the transmission of anything, but change, which is the explanandum 
rather than the explanans.  
The difficulty with the position advocated by Mumford and Anjum is that 
even if one takes it to successfully explain the transfer of energy between objects, 
for example, heat, it does not explain cases where the causal effect also involves 
qualitative change.5 For example, the broken vase that received the hammer’s 
blow has not become more powerful in the way the body near the fire has be-
come hotter; rather, the vase shattered. “Passing around force” does not describe 
being in pieces, by contrast with “passing around heat” which describes being 
hot. We cannot charge this difference to the nonlinearity of the powers’ composi-
tion; the difference requires metaphysical explanation. 
Mumford and Anjum’s book leaves important metaphysical questions still to 
be answered. This is part of the value of the book, and in that, it focuses one’s 
mind to consider the detail of the relations existing at this fundamental level of 
reality and seek clarity to reach understanding. In developing a fuller version of 
Martin’s account of causation, Mumford and Anjum bring in metaphysical tools 
to strengthen it and to supplement it in original ways. It is clear that Mumford 
and Anjum’s account of causation in terms of powers enriches the current de-
bates both on power ontology and causation in many interesting ways, to which 
full justice cannot be done here. To mention one of the most stimulating ideas in 
the book, Mumford and Anjum propose to model causes as vectors (19ff.); this 
is an original approach whose merits would deserve a separate discussion. The 
book also engages interestingly with the special modality that characterizes pow-
ers, something “in between” pure necessity and pure contingency (175). One 
more dimension of the book which deserves attention is Mumford’s and An-
jum’s exploration of how their theory of causation could make a difference to our 
understanding of perception (195ff.) and even to biological explanation (214ff.). 
How the authors will develop these ideas further in their future work is some-
thing I very much look forward to. 
◊     ◊     ◊     ◊     ◊     ◊     ◊
Authors’ reply: Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum 
Getting Causes from Powers offers an account of causation that we think con-
trasts radically with the orthodoxies of the Humean analysis. As is well known, 
Hume believes that we form our idea of causation from four more basic oth-
ers: constant conjunction, temporal priority, contiguity and necessity, though he 
takes the last of these to be illegitimate. We think the jury is still out on contigu-
ity, in the light of some interpretations of quantum entanglement, but we reject 
all the other three. Our starting point is a metaphysics of powers, and we argue 
that if you are serious about powers you should see that causation involves nei-
ther necessity, temporal priority nor constant conjunction. We argue that causa-
tion is a single, unified, and continuous event or process rather than a relation be-
tween distinct and discrete events, that causes and effects are simultaneous and 
5. See Marmodoro, “Aristotelian Powers at work: Reciprocity without symmetry in causation,” 
forthcoming.    
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that causes tend towards their effects without necessitating them. We are grate-
ful to Jennifer McKitrick and Anna Marmodoro for their comments. Both are in 
general sympathetic to the powers approach and their criticisms are taken in that 
spirit. We accept that the ideas would benefit from further development, which 
we hope either ourselves or others will provide in due course.  
Jennifer McKitrick considers whether all things can be truly represented as 
vectors and produces a list of things she thinks cannot. She points to objects, ef-
fects/ events, and dormant powers. She then also takes us to task because we 
have not explained the place of dormant powers in our theory adequately, 
though it certainly looks like we are committed to them. In particular, McKitrick 
points out that we have no account of how dormant powers get activated. 
First: the omissions. Could the world be nothing more than powers repre-
sented as vectors? The statement that “All things are vectors” is actually a quo-
tation from Whitehead (1929, 309), which we do not explore in any great de-
tail, though we do quote it with a degree of approval. Might it be true? Objects 
could be a problem. They are not powers, but bearers of powers. One response 
might be to say that objects are just bundles of properties; and properties are 
just bundles of powers. If that is the case then objects would be constructed 
from powers and although powers tend to travel around together in bundles, 
we do not need an irreducible ontological category of object. The bundling itself 
need not be some additional relation: might there be a bundling power at work 
here? Whitehead himself probably had something even more radical in mind, 
however. In process metaphysics, it is the processes that are basic. Properties 
and particulars are both constructions from those, and one thing we hope the 
book shows is that a powers ontology should be understood as closer to a pro-
cess metaphysics than usually recognized. In that case, omitting objects from 
the picture might be no bad thing. 
Before we dive too much into murky metaphysical waters, however, we ought 
really to declare that the Whitehead quotation was intended primarily in support 
of pandispositionalism. All properties are causally powerful, hence vector-like. 
The Eleatic reality test tells us that to be real is to be powerful, but it seems en-
tirely tenable to say that entities such as objects pass the test in virtue of their 
powerful properties even if they are not reducible to them. Perhaps stated this 
way McKitrick would find the view more credible. 
But there is a more serious omission: the vector model does not represent the 
effects of causation. It shows us only the causes and not what they eventually 
produce. So we are modeling causes as vectors rather than modeling causation. 
We accept this, but defend our reasons for doing so. The key is the rejection of 
causal necessitarianism. The collocation of powers represented in the vector di-
agram tend, and no more than tend, toward an effect. We certainly could not, 
therefore, have a model for causation in which the effect was represented as fol-
lowing without further ado from the cause. McKitrick is correct that “everything 
represented in a vector diagram is consistent with no causation happening.” Yes, 
but what it shows is what will tend to happen, what is disposed to be, without 
there being a guarantee. This is the dispositional modality in practice: the modal-
ity that we argue (chapter 8) is found in all natural causal processes. We need not 
despair of representing effects, however. If causation results in a change, then we 
have new properties instantiated, which for us are new powers, to be represented 
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as new vectors in a new diagram. What is an effect relative to one causal process 
can be a cause relative to another. If you want to depict the history of the world 
in caused events, therefore, we suggest you line up the vector diagrams in their 
temporal sequence. 
McKitrick has an additional worry here. What are we really saying about the 
cases in which an effect fails to occur, and how does that square with our claim 
that causation occurs whenever powers are exercising? Can causation fall short of 
achieving its effect? Suppose partnered powers begin manifesting in a process that 
could result in an effect E, such as sugar being wholly dissolved in liquid or a bil-
liard ball heading toward a collision with an object ball. If we interrupt these pro-
cesses before completion, the cause will not have had “that” effect, E. We have not 
had the complete dissolution, nor the collision; but something has been produced. 
Maybe half of the possible dissolving has occurred, and the billiard ball has trav-
eled some distance. But that certainly is a change, and certainly a caused one. In-
deed, we claim that even where no change has occurred, for instance where pow-
ers perfectly counterbalance in equilibrium, then it is a case of causation. 
McKitrick then asks us what is a manifestation? Is it just the exercise of the 
power? That would be confusing because we seem to allow that powers can have 
different manifestations when working with different mutual manifestation part-
ners. But then we also allow that the manifestation determines the identity of the 
power so must always be the same. Anna Marmodoro picks up on the same is-
sue. Given that the manifestation type determines the power, how can we speak 
of two different powers jointly producing the same manifestation? That would 
entail that the two powers were actually identical, contrary to assumption. 
We try to reconcile these seemingly contrary demands in the same way Mol-
nar (2003, 194–196) does. It is clear that a third element is needed. 
We follow Molnar in saying that the manifestation of a particular power 
should not be understood as the final effect that is produced polygenically, but as 
a contribution toward the effect that the whole set of powers causes. (The only ex-
ception to this is the largely theoretical case where we have a lonely power, oper-
ating in isolation.) He is then able to claim that the same power makes exactly the 
same kind of contribution to any effect of which it is a part of the cause. The iden-
tity of each power is still given by its manifestation type, but that manifestation 
can contribute pleiotropically to many different types of overall effect. We take 
this account from Molnar’s discussion of polygeny and pleiotropy, to which we 
would refer the reader. 
McKitrick’s final complaint is that we do not represent dormant powers. More 
than that, we have no theory of how they come to be triggered if they are dor-
mant. And it seems that we indeed accept the existence of dormant powers. We 
do not deny this. 
In defense, we say that our theory of causation is complete insofar as it can in-
clude all cases of causation. Causation on this view occurs when powers do their 
work. The vector model is suitable for representing such causal processes. That 
there are also powers that are dormant, does not render the theory of causation 
incomplete, nor does it show that the vector model is unsuitable for the purpose 
at hand. When a power is not doing its work, it is not part of the causal story, so 
it is not something we should be trying to include. When it is doing its work, it is 
indeed causally involved, and it can be represented in the vector model. 
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 Our account offers at least some story of how a dormant power might be-
come activated, as McKitrick allows, by the adding or removing of a further ac-
tive power. This is a causal story and one in which we have assumed that at least 
some causal processes are already up and running, affecting each other. But to of-
fer an account of how a first ever dormant power could spring to life and come to 
be activated may well be beyond the scope of our book. It sounds after all like a 
case of creation ex nihilo, which is a mystery for us all. 
Anna Marmodoro also pushes the issue of how powers are activated and 
identifies ambiguity in our theory between the co-workers model and the ingre-
dients model. She then challenges the ancient contagion model of causation, of 
which she takes our causal dispositionalism to be an instance. 
Marmodoro thinks she has identified an ambiguity. In some places, we sug-
gest that effects are things brought about by (hence distinct from) powers mani-
festing themselves. Elsewhere we talk of the manifestation as the sum of (identi-
cal with) the partnered powers. It is the latter view that we would drop from our 
account of causation. It comes from p. 34 where we were initially presenting C B 
Martin’s account of mutual manifestation partnerships, an account that we subse-
quently improve upon. More on this shortly. 
Other concerns are raised, however. What does it mean for the powers to be 
partnered? We say it means that they are working on the same subject of change, 
such as when two heaters are warming a room. But what is that? Is the overlap of 
the manifestation the only connection between the partnered powers? And how 
do we explicate the localization of this overlap? 
While admitting that such an account could be developed in more detail, we 
think that it is a defensible package of claims. Sometimes powers might act on 
the same object. A single thing might be both drilled and cooled at the same time. 
The drilling and cooling powers are acting together in the sense that they oper-
ate on the same object to produce in it a complex change that neither could have 
produced alone. And two partners could be partnered though they never meet. 
Someone’s nervous breakdown might be caused both by their mother and a work 
colleague, each contributing to stress at different times and without ever meeting. 
But we need not limit the action only to being directed upon objects. Some might 
operate jointly on a region, as in the case of the two spatially separated heaters. 
And that local region might in some cases be very large. Consider that motions 
of astral bodies such as comets, whose movements are dictated by gravitational 
fields spreading over vast distances and exerted by multiple bodies. Given that 
causation can range from the very microscopic to very macroscopic, there is no 
reason to limit how local a localized effect should be. 
Marmodoro then points to a tension between two different accounts. In places, 
it seems we subscribe to the co-workers model, in which powers produce their ef-
fects. In other places, we seem to prefer an ingredients model, where powers 
make-up their effect. She notes that two different metaphysical principles are in 
play. She is right. The latter ingredients model comes from our discussion of how 
component powers constitute resultant powers. Our response is that they indeed 
make them up, that is, they constitute them in the sort of way the clay constitutes 
the statue. But this issue of the relation between component and resultant powers 
is distinct from the issue of how powers produce their effects and rightly requires 
a different principle. Composition of causes is a different matter from that of any 
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subsequent causal production by those resultant, composed powers. In compos-
ing to form a resultant power, we are still talking about the powers themselves, 
whereas in talking about causation we are talking about how those powers, or 
how that resultant power produces its effect (and as we are causal dispositional-
ists, as McKitrick notes, we cannot straightforwardly infer from a resultant vector 
to what is actually produced because the resultant only tends towards an effect). 
Marmodoro pushes further on the question of composition of powers, test-
ing our accounts of both linear and nonlinear composition. In the first place, she 
says (in a footnote) that the examples we cite in a quotation concern substances 
rather than properties, and it is unclear how we would extend Martin’s account 
accordingly. And in the case of the nonlinear effect of wealth upon happiness, 
how could someone’s wealth literally become their happiness. 
This is where it is significant that while we adopt Martin’s mutual manifesta-
tion model, we revise it in many respects. We do not accept his understanding of 
how it works, nor what it means for causation. He uses the model to replace the 
notion of causation, for example, which we do not. We do not think that the part-
nered powers are identical with the effect, which Martin does. As we understand 
it, Martin indeed has an ingredients model in place of a notion of causation. We 
reject Martin’s version of mutual manifestation precisely because there are many 
features of causation this view could not explain. Again, an ingredients model 
might work for the composition of resultant powers from their components, but 
it does not work as an account of powers bringing about an effect. Usually effects 
will take time to develop, through a process that may be genuinely transforma-
tive. Effects are not just the aggregate of their causes. It seems as if Martin is try-
ing to eliminate causation in favor of mere mereological composition of powers, 
which is wrong. 
In the example of ours that Marmodoro discusses, we would defend the 
view that being wealthy and being happy are indeed properties, powerful ones, 
that are attributable to persons. And given that we reject the ingredients model, 
one’s wealth does not become one’s happiness. So there is no categorical tran-
sition, as is alleged. Rather, wealth has a power to affect happiness though in 
a nonlinear way. Being twice as wealthy does not necessarily dispose toward 
twice as much happiness. 
We hope we have now sufficiently distinguished the co-workers model for the 
production of effects from the ingredients model for the composition of causes. 
There is a further account that Marmodoro attributes to us, however: a conta-
gion model of causation. We say that causation is a passing round of powers, but 
surely powers are not literally transmitted from the cause to the effect. 
In the book, we leave open the exact way in which powers are passed around. 
To an extent that would depend on one’s other metaphysical commitments. Sup-
pose you are a trope theorist, for instance. Tropes are nontransferable, we believe, 
so in no strong sense are they transmitted. But “passing on” can have different 
meanings. We need not think of it as being like playing pass the parcel or passing 
round a cigarette. But there is good sense in the idea of passing on a virus, pass-
ing on momentum, and, better still, passing on an idea or message where no ac-
tual matter is transferred. Such a view might indeed suit better the mild kind of 
process ontology that can be found between the lines of Getting Causes from Pow-
ers. But we cannot develop that thought here. 
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We are given one last challenge in relation to this idea. Perhaps momentum 
can be passed between distinct substances where this is merely a passing on of 
energy. There are many transfer theories of causation that would accept this. But 
our account does not explain qualitative change. We agree that there are many 
cases of causation where the powers received by the effect are not the same as 
those possessed by the cause. The broken vase has a power to cut residing in 
the sharpness of its pieces, but the hammer that produced the breakage did not 
have that power. It is not always the same power that is passed on in causation; 
but it is some power. And if our broad notion of passing on were to be accepted, 
we think it can apply also in this case. The powers of the cause, for instance of 
the hammer, produce a change in the object affected. Given that the change is a 
change in the properties of the thing affected, and properties are powers, then it 
seems reasonable to understand this as a case of new powers being given to the 
effect by the cause. 
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